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KICK IT UP A NOTCH:
FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION
FOR COMMERCIAL SPEECH
Deborah J. La Fetrat
In this Information Age,' corporate communications join with
individual and group speech, the gamut of media from one-person
blogs2 and pirate radio stations 3 to Big Media megacorporations,
4
government speakers,5 and others who engage in public dialogue.
t Principal Attorney, Pacific Legal Foundation. Ms. La Fetra filed amicus briefs in Nike
v. Kasky in both the California Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court in support
of Nike's First Amendment right to speak. The author thanks Robert K. Best and Anthony T.
Caso for their valuable comments on earlier drafts, and thanks Bruce La Fetra for his unending
support.
See JAMES A. DEWAR, THE INFORMATION AGE AND THE PRINTING PRESS: LOOKING
BACKWARD TO SEE AHEAD 4, http://www.rand.org/publications/P/P8014/P8014.pdf (1998)
(arguing that the term "information age" refers to technological breakthroughs that make it
easier to distribute information to a wider audience; the most important component of which is
the Internet and networked computers).
2 A "blog" is an online diary, the best of which contain serious commentary on current
events and links to primary sources and other commentary. Blogs can be general (e.g.,
www.instapundit.com (culling resources and commenting on a variety of domestic policies and
the war on terror)) or very specialized (e.g., www.overlawyered.com (issues relating to tort law
and the civil justice system)). Blogs devoted to legal matters are called "blawgs." See generally
David Narkiewicz, Blogs, Bloggers and Blawgs, PA. LAW., May-June 2003, at 49.
3 See John Alderman, Radio "Pirates" Show the Flag, WIRED NEWS (Jun. 15, 1998), at
http://www.wired.com/news/culture/0,1284,12991,00.html (describing a convention of small-
scale independent radio broadcasters, many of whom dedicate programming to those without a
voice in mainstream commercial programming); see also Marc Fisher, Low-Power to the Peo-
ple, AM. JOURNALISM REV., Oct. 1, 2000, at 42, available at 2000 WL 18883442 (noting that
political activists, church groups and music fans are seeking low-power radio licenses in ever-
increasing numbers).
4 See Daniel Hade, Storytelling: Are Publishers Changing the Way Children Read?, 78
HORN BOOK 509 (2002), available at 2002 WL 9599248 (noting that eight multinational corpo-
rations dominate children's book publishing and cross-market licensed characters across toys,
clothes, music and videos).
5 See generally Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Govern-
ment Speech, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1377 (2001); Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L.
REV. 565 (1980); Mark G. Yudof, When Government Speaks: Toward a Theory of Government
Expression and the First Amendment, 57 TEX. L. REV. 863 (1979).
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Some corporate speech is mandated.6 Some is meant for internal
consumption only.7  Some is traditional advertising. More and
more frequently, however, corporate speech also contributes to
public debates on matters of general interest, such as the econ-
omy, 8 the environment, 9 and foreign trade.'0  As participants in
these debates, businesses present a distinct point of view and in-
formation that may be unavailable to other participants, or infor-
mation which other participants may not choose to reveal.
The United States Supreme Court's inconsistent approach to
commercial speech" has led to confusion in the lower courts.
12
Thus, First Amendment practitioners and scholars saw a real op-
portunity for clarification when the Supreme Court granted the pe-
tition for a writ of certiorari in Nike v. Kasky, 13 which asked the
Court to answer the question of whether Nike's image-building
public relations campaign in the wake of allegations of overseas
sweatshop labor was protected under the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution, 4  or whether it was "commercial
speech" susceptible to legal challenge under California's Unfair
6 See generally Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the
Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669 (1994).
7 See, e.g., Thomas R. Mulroy, Jr. & W. Joseph Thesing, Jr., Confidentiality Concerns in
Internal Corporate Investigations, 25 TORT & INS. L.J. 48 (1989).
8 See, e.g., Rick Wagoner (chairman and CEO, General Motors), Remarks to the Eco-
nomic Business Club (May 2, 2003) (supporting President Bush's economic stimulus package),
at http://media.gm.com/news/speeches/030514_wagoner.htnl (last visited Apr. 16, 2004).
9 See, e.g., Letter from R. Bruce Josten, Executive Vice President, Government Affairs,
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, to the U.S. House of Representatives in Support of H.R. 6, the
Energy Policy Act of 2003 (Apr. 10, 2003), at http://www.uschamber.com/govemment/letters/
030410hr6.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2004).
10 See, e.g., Jonathan Bloom et al., U.S. Software Industry in Favor of NAFTA, 5 J. PRO-
PRIETARY RTS. 34 (1993) (announcing Microsoft and WordPerfect corporations' support for the
North American Free Trade Agreement).
II Confusion in First Amendment jurisprudence is not limited to cases involving commer-
cial speech. As Professor Robert Post notes, the entire field is rife with contradictions:
First Amendment doctrine veers between theory and the exigencies of specific cases.
The function of doctrine is both to implement the objectives attributed by theory to
the Constitution and to offer principled grounds of justification for particular deci-
sions. Doctrine becomes confused when the requirements of theory make little sense
in the actual circumstances of concrete cases, or when doctrine is required to articu-
late the implications of inconsistent theories. First Amendment doctrine has unfor-
tunately suffered from both these difficulties.
Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88 CAL. L.
REV. 2353, 2355-56 (2000).
12 See infra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
13 Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 817 (2003). For a sampling of reaction from academics
and corporate counsel, see Gary Young, Nike Ruling: Just How Chilling Is It?, NAT'L L.J., Jan.
20, 2003, at A9.
14 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting ... the freedom of
speech .... "). The First Amendment applies to the states by its incorporation through the Four-
teenth Amendment. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
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Competition Law.15 The California Supreme Court's split decision
in the case starkly revealed the disarray in this aspect of First
Amendment jurisprudence. By accepting the petition, the Court
embraced an opportunity to revisit the question: To what degree do
we value corporate speech, and, consequently, to what degree will
corporate speech be protected under the First Amendment? Unfor-
tunately, when the Court dismissed the petition, the opportunity
was set aside for another day.
Using Nike as a jumping-off point, this Article argues in favor
of full First Amendment protection' 6 for corporate speech on two
fundamental grounds.' 7 First, corporations and other business in-
terests play a vital role in the American political economy, thus
imbuing corporate speech with inherent value in our democratic
society. Rather than treating such speech as a hostile intruder in
public debate, it should be embraced as presenting a point of view
that may well otherwise remain unexpressed.' 8  Second, the line
between commercial and noncommercial speech was already fuzzy
when Ninth Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski and Stuart Banner pub-
lished their oft-cited article, "Who's Afraid of Commercial
Speech?" in 1990.'9 Fourteen years later, the line is so blurred as
to be indistinguishable. With greater frequency and subtlety, new
technologies and innovative marketing strategies introduce corpo-
rate profit-motive into what otherwise would be fully-protected
speech. 20  The current commercial speech doctrine cannot pre-
dictably resolve disputes resulting from these new modes of ex-
pression.
Corporate speech takes many different forms and addresses
issues far beyond offering to sell new, improved widgets at low,
15 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200-209 (West 2000).
16 Infringements on fully protected speech are subjected to strict scrutiny: only the least
restrictive means necessary to further a compelling state interest will past constitutional muster.
See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 346 (1995); Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976) (per curiam).
17 This Article uses the terms "corporate speech" and "commercial speech" interchangea-
bly, even though individuals or unincorporated partnerships certainly may engage in speech in
the name of a business or to further business interests.
18 See infra notes 87-140 and accompanying text.
19 See Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech, 76 VA. L.
REv. 627, 631 (1990) (discussing the Supreme Court's analysis comparing commercial and non-
commercial speech). Supreme Court citations to this article include: Lorillard Tobacco Co. v.
Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 575 (2001), Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S.
173, 184 (1999), and 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 523 (1996). Lower
courts have relied on it as well: Adventure Communications, Inc. v. Ky. Registry of Election
Fin., 191 F.3d 429, 440 (4th Cir. 1999), United Reporting Pub. Corp. v. Cal. Highway Patrol,
146 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1998), Knoll Pharm. Co. v. Sherman, 57 F. Supp. 2d 615, 620
(N.D. 111. 1999), and West Virginia ex rel. McGraw v. Imperial Mktg., 472 S.E.2d 792, 806
(W.Va. 1996).
20 See infra notes 151-190 and accompanying text.
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low prices. Even when the speech is fairly straightforward in its
attempt to bolster the bottom line, it is so frequently intermingled
with otherwise protected speech that courts simply cannot deter-
mine where the speech falls in the tangled web of cases comprising
the "commercial speech doctrine."'2  A failure to recognize the
important public benefits of corporate speech allows courts to
ratchet downward the protection due not only to commercial
speech, but to any speech that has even the slightest element of
commercial gain for the speaker.
I. NIKE V. KASKY THROUGH THE COURTS
In the 1990s, Nike took a shellacking for what activists main-
tained were substandard labor practices in foreign factories that
subcontracted with Nike to make athletic shoes. The allegations
of abuse and calls for boycotting were widespread23 and the subject
of many television, radio, and print reports. 24 To defend its corpo-
rate image, Nike commissioned former United States Ambassador
21 See infra notes 74-86 and accompanying text.
22 News reports alleged that workers in foreign factories manufacturing Nike products
were paid less than the applicable local minimum wage; required to work overtime;
allowed and encouraged to work more overtime hours than applicable local law al-
lowed; subjected to physical, verbal, and sexual abuse; and exposed to toxic chemi-
cals, noise, heat, and dust without adequate safety equipment, in violation of appli-
cable local occupational health and safety regulations.
Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 248 (Cal. 2002).
23 Id. Organizations calling for boycotts of Nike products include: Vietnam Labor Watch,
at http://www.saigon.com/-nike (last visited Apr. 16, 2004); Global Exchange, at
http://www.globalexchange.org/economy/corporations/nike/starterkit.html (last visited Apr.
16, 2004); and Justice: Do It Nike, at http://www.citinv.it/associazionilCNMS/archivio/
strategie/nikeboycott.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2004). See also Josh Feit, Swooshtika Politics,
SONOMA COUNTY INDEPENDENT, Dec. 11-17, 1997, http://www.metroactive.com/papers/
sonoma/12.11.97/nike-9750.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2004) (describing a coordinated day of
protest against Nike). As Feit described:
That Saturday, dubbed Anti-Nike Day, protesters demonstrated in 13 countries, 25
states and 50 communities across the United States. In downtown Portland, 75 dem-
onstrators picketed Nike Town. In Manhattan-at the Nike complex on 57th and
Madison Avenue-radio personality and activist Jim Hightower introduced a new
word into the English language: Swooshtika. "Nike is the perfect corporate villain
for these times," Hightower said, "an example of the new global corporate hegem-
ony."
Id.
24 See, e.g., Harvey Araton, Student Protests Shame Nike Athletes, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22,
1997 at B17; Bob Herbert, Trampled Dreams, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 1996 at A27; Editorial, The
Nike 'Swoosh' Signals Exploitation, BUFFALO NEWS, Nov. 12, 1997 at 2B. The CBS News
report 48 Hours also presented a segment highly critical of Nike. Transcript, Oct. 17, 1996
(included in Petitioner's Lodging (Reprinted) in the United States Supreme Court, at 117-125),
copy on file with author. Despite efforts to counter these attacks, criticism continues. See Brian
J. Back, Nike Stomachs Familiar Attack on Overseas Labor, Bus. J. PORTLAND, Mar. 8, 2002,
http://portland.bizjoumals.comportlandstories/200203/04/daily51.html (last visited Apr. 16,
2004); John H. Cushman, Jr., Nike Pledges to End Child Labor and Increase Safety, N.Y.
TIMES, May 13, 1998 at D1.
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to the United Nations Andrew Young to investigate the com-
plaints.25 When Ambassador Young returned a report largely ex-
onerating the company, Nike publicized the report through press
releases, letters to the editors of major newspapers, and letters to
university presidents and directors of college athletic depart-
26ments.
San Francisco activist Marc Kasky 27 believed these communi-
cations contained misleading and false statements about the work-
ing conditions at the Southeast Asian factories that manufacture
certain Nike products.28 He sued Nike under California's Unfair
Competition Law.29  This law does not apply only to false or
fraudulent or otherwise illegal statements; any statement deemed
to be "misleading" or "unfair" can be the basis for a lawsuit.
30
Kasky disclaimed any personal knowledge of the facts underlying
his case; 3 1 nevertheless, his complaint alleged that Nike's response
2 Kasky, 45 P.3d at 248.
26 Id.
27 Marc Kasky is a former marathon runner and executive director of the Fort Mason Cen-
ter, a collection of nonprofit educational foundations located on the former Fort Mason Army
base in San Francisco. He has "a long history of environmental, volunteer and community
service." Steve Rubenstein, Marc Kasky: S.F. Man Changes from Customer to Nike Adversary,
S.F. CHRON., May 3, 2002, at A6.
28 Kasky, 45 P.3d at 247-48.
29 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200-209 (1997).
30 The law prohibits "any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and un-
fair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising." § 17200. For the purposes of the statutory
scheme, "advertising" includes any statement relating to the speaker's products or services that
is received in California, regardless of the location where the speech was uttered. § 17500. Any
California citizen may bring a lawsuit alleging violations of these provisions. § 17204. No
personal injury need be sustained. Gregory v. Albertson's, Inc., 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 389, 392
(Cal. Ct. App. 2002). Nor is there any requirement that the public actually relied on the com-
pany's actions. Bank of the West v. Superior Court, 833 P.2d 545, 553 (Cal. 1992). Moreover,
even literally true statements can lead to liability if they are deemed "misleading," notwithstand-
ing the speaker's attempts to ensure the accuracy of the speech. See Rothschild v. Tyco Int'l
(US), Inc., 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 721, 725 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that the Unfair Competition
Law is a strict liability statute; defendants' intent to mislead is irrelevant). If a business is found
to violate the Unfair Competition Law, penalties include injunctive relief (including corrective
speech) and "restitution," in which the business must "return money obtained through an unfair
business practice to those persons in interest from whom the property was taken." Kasky, 45
P.3d at 249; see also Searle v. Wyndham Int'l, Inc., 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 231, 236 (Cal. Ct. App.
2002). There is no requirement that the plaintiff, or the public at large, actually relied on the
misstatements. Klein v. Earth Elements, Inc., 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 623, 626 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997)
("Unlike common law fraud, a section 17200 violation can be established even if no one was
actually deceived, relied upon the fraudulent practice or sustained any damage.").
31 Complaint for Statutory, Equitable and Injunctive Relief at 2, 6, Kasky v. Nike,
Inc., 45 P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002) (No. 994446). This lack of knowledge was the subject of the
amicus brief filed by the United States Department of Justice. The Department of Justice ar-
gued that:
Regardless of whether Nike's statements are "commercial" or "non-commercial"
speech, they are not actionable in a private suit unless the plaintiff alleges not only
that the statements were false, but that he himself relied on them and, as a result, suf-
fered injury in fact warranting judicial relief. In the context of private causes of ac-
tion, those requirements ensure that any restriction on speech is justified by the gov-
2004]
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to public criticism of its labor practices consisted of misrepresenta-
tions prohibited by the Unfair Competition Law.32 Nike asked the
trial court to dismiss the lawsuit on the grounds that it had a First
Amendment right to engage in the public debate over foreign labor
practices, in which Nike itself had emerged as the primary exam-
ple.33  The trial court agreed and dismissed the lawsuit. 34  The
court of appeal affirmed the decision.
35
But the California Supreme Court reversed. In a 4-3 split de-
cision, the state high court ruled that whether Nike was protected
by the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech depends on
whether the speech in question is "commercial" or not. The court
held that "when a court must decide whether particular speech
may be subjected to laws aimed at preventing false advertising or
other forms of commercial deception, categorizing a particular
statement as commercial or noncommercial speech requires con-
sideration of three elements: the speaker, the intended audience,
and the content of the message. 36 The court tried to downplay the
nature of its holding, claiming that it merely meant "that when a
business enterprise, to promote and defend its sales and profits,
makes factual representations about its own products or its own
operations, it must speak truthfully. ' 37  Nevertheless, the court
emnment's interest in preventing actual fraud and compensating injured individuals.
Those same requirements give substantial protection for speech, even by a corpora-
tion, that does not injure individuals or materially affect their purchasing decisions.
California's contrary regime unduly burdens and deters speech-whether commer-
cial or non-commercial-and is inconsistent with First Amendment values.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 8, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky,
123 S. Ct. 817 (2003) (No. 02-575), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/osgbriefs/200213mer/
lami/2002-0575.mer.ami.pdf. As it turned out, the Court found this argument persuasive in its
disposition of the case. See infra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
32 Complaint for Statutory, Equitable and Injunctive Relief at 1(a)-(g), Kasky v. Nike,
Inc., 45 P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002) (No. 994446). Professor Weinstein argues that the Unfair Compe-
tition Law is viewpoint-neutral on its face. James Weinstein, Speech Categorization and the
Limits of First Amendment Formalism: Lessons from Nike v. Kasky, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
1091, 1112 (2004). However, both the language of the statute and the courts' interpretation of
the language contradict that view. Section 17200 prohibits any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent
business act or practice. Consumer advocacy groups who are not engaged in "business" are not
covered by the statute. Section 17500 makes it unlawful for any person or corporation "with
intent ... to dispose of ... property or to perform services ... or anything ... to induce the
public to enter into any obligation relating thereto" to make a misleading statement. A person
with the intent of purchasing property or services, or a person with the intent of interfering with
the purchase of property or services is not covered by the statute. See Isuzu Motors Ltd. v.
Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1048 (C.D. Cal. 1998); Hewlett v. Squaw
Valley Ski Corp., 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 118 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
33 Kasky, 45 P.3d at 248.
34 Id.
35 Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 854 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
36 Kasky, 45 P.3d at 256.
37 Id. at 301. Regardless of the California court's intent to narrow the context of its hold-
ing, there was, of course, nothing to prevent other courts from considering the reasoning persua-
1210 [Vol. 54:4
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held that if the speech is "commercial," then the First Amendment
does not protect misleading statements, even though such state-
ments would be fully protected when expressed by any other
speaker.
The California high court's decision interpreted any type of
corporate speech as contributing nothing more to the marketplace
of ideas than "Please buy our product., 38 Yet Nike's letters to the
editors obviously did not ask the editor to buy sneakers; instead,
Nike was defending its overseas labor practices. Did Nike hope
that its defense would undermine the activists' calls for boycotts of
the company's products? Of course. But the court's expansive
definition of "commercial speech" was unprecedented.
Dissenting justices assailed the majority opinion for creating
an uneven playing field in matters of public debate. The major-
ity's patronizing assumption that people cannot discount speech
made by someone with an interest in a particular outcome led to a
California decision in which the corporate side of a public debate
is stifled in its entirety. 39  Dissenting Justice Ming Chin argued
that Nike's speech was wrongly deprived of First Amendment pro-
tection only because the company "competes not only in the mar-
ketplace of ideas, but also in the marketplace of manufactured
goods." 40
Dissenting Justice Janice Brown went further. She took issue
with the Supreme Court's current commercial speech doctrine that
is dependent on speech being categorized as either commercial or
noncommercial, with little quarter given to speech that contains
elements of both.41 Contemporary marketing, she argued, involves
speech far more intermingled than segregated: "With the growth of
commercialism, the politicization of commercial interests, and the
sive enough to depart from the consumer fraud context to which the court tries to limit it.
38 The concept of the "marketplace of ideas" was at the foundation of Justice Douglas's
dissent in Dennis v. United States:
When ideas compete in the market for acceptance, full and free discussion exposes
the false and they gain few adherents. Full and free discussion even of ideas we hate
encourages the testing of our own prejudices and preconceptions. Full and free dis-
cussion keeps a society from becoming stagnant and unprepared for the stresses and
strains that work to tear all civilizations apart.
341 U.S. 494, 584 (1951).
39 See, e.g., Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2002 at A36 (The California court "applied
consumer protection laws to stifle corporate speech in a vital political debate"); Roger Parloff,
Can We Talk?, FoRTUNE, Sept. 2, 2002 at 110 (quoting former Clinton Administration Solicitor
General Walter Dellinger, "The California decision, if upheld, will have both a chilling and a
distorting effect on public debate. The public will be the loser .... The media ... will not be
able to present a balanced account of a public controversy if one side of the controversy isn't
free to speak out without [risking] substantial sanctions").
40 Kasky, 45 P.3d at 263 (Chin, J., dissenting, with Baxter, J., concurring in the dissent).
41 Id. at 325-27 (Brown, J., dissenting).
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increasing sophistication of commercial advertising over the past
century, the gap between commercial and noncommercial speech
is rapidly shrinking., 42 She further lamented, "I believe the com-
mercial speech doctrine, in its current form, fails to account for the
realities of the modern world-a world in which personal, politi-
cal, and commercial arenas no longer have sharply defined
boundaries. 43
Nike petitioned the Supreme Court to review the decision, and
the Court agreed."4 Unfortunately, after full briefing (including 31
amicus briefs on both sides) and oral argument, the Court dis-
missed the case as improvidently granted on the last day of the
Term.45 This dismissal, however, was accompanied by two opin-
ions. Justice Stevens, with Justice Ginsberg concurring in full and
Justice Souter concurring in part, wrote an opinion explaining why
he believed the dismissal was appropriate.
46
On the other hand, Justice Breyer, with Justice O'Connor con-
curring, argued that the case should have been decided on the mer-
its.47 This decision offers few clues to the full Court's evolving
jurisprudence in the area of commercial speech, but contains some
intriguing suggestions. First, Justice Breyer acknowledges that the
Court's refusal to issue an opinion on the merits in this case may
have the effect of causing corporations to refrain from speaking
when they otherwise would participate in public dialogue. 48  On
the merits, Breyer suggested that the principle guiding resolution
of the case is the Court's previous recognition that "speech on mat-
ters of public concern needs 'breathing space'-potentially incor-
porating certain false or misleading speech-in order to survive." 49
Based on the primacy of this principle, Breyer would apply height-
42 Id. at 326-27 (Brown, J., dissenting).
43 Id. at 327 (Brown, J., dissenting).
44 Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 537 U.S. 1099 (2003).
45 Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S.Ct. 2554 (2003).
46 Id. The reasons were largely procedural: "(1) the judgment entered by the California
Supreme Court was not final within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1257; (2) neither party has
standing to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court; and (3) the reasons for avoiding the prema-
ture adjudication of novel constitutional questions apply with special force to this case." Id. at
2555. The third point related to the lack of a factual record. Id.
47 Id. at 2559. Justice Kennedy also appended a one-line opinion that the Court should not
have dismissed the case. Id.
48 Id. at 2560 ("In my view, however, the questions presented directly concern the free-
dom of Americans to speak about public matters in public debate, no jurisdictional rule prevents
us from deciding those questions now, and delay itself may inhibit the exercise of constitution-
ally protected rights of free speech without making the issue significantly easier to decide later
on.").
49 Id. at 2565 (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 (1964)).
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ened scrutiny to the provisions of the Unfair Competition Law at
issue, and would further find those provisions unconstitutional.5 °
Breyer then turned his attention to the one of the nine chal-
lenged Nike communications that he thought veered closest to the
"commercial speech" line: a letter to university presidents and ath-
letic directors. 51 Breyer accepted the California Supreme Court's
characterization of the letter as one containing several commercial
elements: it was written by a commercial speaker to a commercial
audience on the subject of the company's own business practices.52
However, Breyer found other, less commercial, elements more
compelling: the letters were not in any kind of traditional advertis-
ing format, did not present or propose any commercial transaction,
and "provide[d] 'information useful in discussions' with concerned
faculty and students. 53 Perhaps most importantly, "the letter's
content makes clear that, in context, it concerns a matter that is of
significant public interest and active controversy, and it describes
factual matters related to that subject in detail. 54 Breyer further
noted that the facts asserted in the communication were central to
the public debate, not peripheral.55
Having determined that these communications were worthy of
heightened scrutiny, 56 Justice Breyer opined that "there is no rea-
sonable 'fit' between the burden it imposes upon speech and the
important governmental 'interest served."' 57 While finding public
worth in false advertising statutes as a general matter, Breyer was
particularly troubled by the provision in California's Unfair Com-
petition Law that permits a private right of action without any
showing of injury and regardless of whether the business acted
intentionally.58
Echoing Justice Chin's dissent, Justice Breyer wrote:
[A] commercial speaker must take particular care-
considerably more care than the speaker's noncommercial
opponents-when speaking on public matters. A large or-
ganization's unqualified claim about the adequacy of work-
ing conditions, for example, could lead to liability, should a
court conclude after hearing the evidence that enough excep-
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 2565-66.
54 Id. at 2566.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id. (citation omitted).
58 Id. at 2567.
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tions exist to warrant qualification---even if those exceptions
were unknown (but perhaps should have been known) to the
speaker. Uncertainty about how a court will view these, or
other, statements, can easily chill a speaker's efforts to en-
gage in public debate-particularly where a "false advertis-
ing" law, like California's law, imposes liability based upon
negligence or without fault. At the least, they create concern
that the commercial speaker engaging in public debate suf-
fers a handicap that noncommercial opponents do not.59
Summing up the impact of the California Supreme Court's deci-
sion, Breyer wrote that "[tlhe upshot is that commercial speakers
doing business in California may hesitate to issue significant
communications relevant to public debate because they fear poten-
tial lawsuits and legal liability., 60 Thus, the decision to remand
the case ushers in a new period of uncertainty, particularly in Cali-
fornia, in which corporate speakers must decide to what extent, if
any, they risk responding to attacks or choosing to engage in de-
bate whether initiated by themselves or others.6'
Three months later, Kasky and Nike settled the lawsuit.
62
Nike's agreement to contribute substantial funds to the Fair Labor
Association to assist workers internationally was applauded by that
organization's Executive Director, Auret van Heerden, as "a long-
59 Id. (internal citations omitted).
60 Id. at 2568. In fact, Nike has reduced its communications with the public, particularly
in California. Nike no longer publishes its annual Corporate Social Responsibility report, and,
after the California Supreme Court ruling, it did not file a listing in the Dow Jones Sustainability
Report. Douglas K. Spong, Golden State Silence: High Court Non-decision Puts Chill on Cor-
porate Speech, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRtBUNE, July 21, 2003, available at http://www.prfinns
.org/resourceslnike/nikeO72103.asp (last visited Apr. 16, 2004); see also Press Release, Nike,
Inc., Statement by Nike, Inc. on Today's Procedural Decision by the U.S. Supreme Court in
First Amendment Case (June 26, 2003), available at http:llwww.nike.comlnikebizlnews/
pressrelease.jhtmil?year=2003&month=06&letter=f (last visited Apr. 16, 2004).
61 See Henry Gomez, High Court's Nike Decision Worries Area PR Companies, SACRA-
MENTO BEE, July 17, 2003, available at http://www.sacbee.com/content/news/courts legal/
story/7047508p-7995812c.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2004) (noting that lawsuits have left little
room for differences of opinion between activists and companies and pointing specifically to a
lawsuit filed by People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals against Kentucky Fried Chicken
and its parent company over the companies' assertions about the treatment of chickens destined
for the restaurants).
62 Press Release, Nike, Inc., Nike, Inc. and Kasky Announce Settlement of Kasky v. Nike
First Amendment Case (Sept. 12, 2003), available at http://www.nike.com/nikebiz/news/
pressrelease.jhtml?year=2003&month--09&letter=-f (last visited Apr. 16, 2004). Nike agreed to
contribute $1.5 million to the Fair Labor Association (www.fairlabor.org) to fund (1) "increased
training and local capacity building to improve the quality of independent monitoring in manu-
facturing countries;" (2) "[w]orker development programs focused on education and economic
opportunity, and;" (3) "[m]ulti-sector collaboration to advance a common global standard to
measure and report on corporate responsibility performance among companies." Id. Nike also
agreed to continue funding its existing worker education programs and micro-loan program for
two years. Id.
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term plus for corporate accountability and improved consumer in-
formation. 63  But if the contributions benefit consumers in the
long-term, short-term gains are not so apparent: Nike chose not to
release its fiscal year 2002 corporate responsibility report outside
the company and announced it would "continue to limit its partici-
pation in public events and media engagement in California."
64
II. THE CURRENT COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE LEADS TO
UNPREDICTABLE-AND UNACCEPTABLE-RESULTS
Over the past 60 years, the Supreme Court's approach to
speech uttered by business interests has ranged from zero protec-
tion, 65 to very high protection, 66 to a four-part test, 67 which has it-
self undergone revision.68  There have been conflicting analyses
depending on the speaker69 and the social worth of the activity
promoted. 70  The commercial speech doctrine as currently applied
by the Supreme Court and lower courts can lead to highly unpre-
dictable results, with the California Supreme Court majority opin-
ion in Kasky v. Nike holding the dubious title of Exhibit A. Pull-
ing a little of this and a little of that from a variety of the Supreme
Court's opinions, the California Supreme Court developed a new
63 Id.
6 Id. Five days after the settlement was announced, the California Supreme Court
granted review in Kids Against Pollution v. California Dental Ass'n, which presents the ques-
tion, inter alia, of whether a trade association's ethical code is commercial speech. 76 P.3d 843
(Cal. 2003). The California Court of Appeals held that an association's advisory opinion dis-
seminating the standards set in the ethical code (relating to claims about the levels or toxicity of
mercury in "silver" fillings) was protected speech. 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d 373, 389-90 (Cal. Ct. App.
2003). The petitioners claim that the communications made to enforce the ethical code are
commercial speech and therefore not entitled to First Amendment protection under the Kasky
analysis. Id. at 385. Thus, the court has an opportunity in Kids to revisit Kasky.
65 See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
66 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
761-62 (1976).
67 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980).
68 See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 504 (1996) (holding that when a
regulation constitutes a blanket prohibition against truthful, nonmisleading speech about a law-
ful product and the ban serves an interest unrelated to consumer protection, it will be subject to
a heightened form of First Amendment scrutiny akin to strict scrutiny); Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492
U.S. 469, 480 (1989) (upholding a regulation outlawing Tupperware parties on a university
campus).
69 See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (lesser protection ac-
corded to attorney solicitations); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977).
70 Compare Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 342, 348
(1986) (restrictions on advertisements for legal gambling facilities do not violate the First
Amendment), with Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980) (re-
strictions on solicitations for charity struck down). But see Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemar-
keting Assocs., 123 S. Ct. 1829, 1840-42 (2003) (holding that telemarketing raising funds for
charity is subject to liability under laws against fraud, where telemarketers made false state-
ments directly to potential donors; Schaumburg was distinguished because the issue there was
whether the percentage actually made available to the charity could be a proxy for fraud).
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doctrine unlike any that the Supreme Court-or any other court-
ever articulated. 71  This unpredictability by itself is sufficient rea-
72son to scrap the existing doctrine.
The Supreme Court's approach to commercial speech has
been oft-changing, but mostly derisive. In Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York, the
Court formulated a four-part test against which restrictions on
commercial speech would be weighed:
For commercial speech to come within [the First Amend-
ment], [1] it at least must concern lawful activity and not be
misleading. Next, we ask [2] whether the asserted govern-
mental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive
answers, we must determine [3] whether the regulation di-
rectly advances the governmental interest asserted, and [4]
whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve
that interest.
73
The Supreme Court later expanded Central Hudson's inherent
flexibility.74 Unfortunately, this flexibility "left both sides of the
debate with their own well of precedent from which to draw. ' 5
The call to reform the commercial speech doctrine has been
growing in intensity in recent years. The Supreme Court itself has
been unable to apply Central Hudson in any predictable way76 and
71 The petition for a writ of certiorari filed in the United States Supreme Court character-
ized the test as breathtaking in scope and "outlandish." Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10, 24,
Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 817 (2003) (No. 02-575).
72 Certainty and predictability are long-accepted pillars of the rule of law because they
promote confidence in the rule of law, and make dispute resolution less costly. Joseph R.
Grodin, Are Rules Really Better Than Standards?, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 569, 570 (1994). Certainty
achieves fairness to those who rely upon the law, efficiency in following precedent, continuity
and equality in treating similar cases equally. See McGregor Co. v. Heritage, 631 P.2d 1355,
1366 (Or. 1981) (Peterson, J., concurring). Certainty also promotes business innovation and
development by letting firms know what they can and cannot do. Further, by eliminating specu-
lation as to what the law is and avoiding a need for interpretation, clarification, or explanation,
certainty promotes efficiency for businesses and individuals. See Paul E. Loving, The Justice of
Certainty, 73 OR. L. REV. 743, 764 (1994).
73 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
74 See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) (requiring a "reasonable fit"
rather than the least restrictive means to comply with the fourth prong); see also Steven Shiffrin,
The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away From a General Theory of the First
Amendment, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 1212, 1222 (1983) ("[C]ommercial speech" was "an empty
vessel into which content is poured" even before Fox.).
75 See Floyd Abrams, A Growing Marketplace of Ideas, LEGAL TIMES, July 26, 1993, at
S28.
76 See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 527 (1996) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (noting that courts have had difficulty in applying the Central Hudson balancing
test "with any uniformity"); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 419-
20 (1993) ("This very case illustrates the difficulty of drawing bright lines that will clearly cabin
commercial speech in a distinct category .... The absence of a categorical definition... is also
a characteristic of our opinions considering the constitutionality of regulations of commercial
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many lower courts have expressly noted their struggle to apply
Central Hudson." Moreover, the Court has noted the entreaties of
"certain judges, scholars, and amici curiae" to repudiate Central
Hudson and "implement[] ... a more straightforward and stringent
test for assessing the validity of governmental restrictions on
commercial speech. 78
The commercial speech doctrine has become nearly impossi-
ble to apply because "commercial speech" is often extremely diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to identify.79 The Supreme Court has long
recognized that speech can serve dual functions:
[M]uch linguistic expression serves a dual communicative
function: it conveys not only ideas capable of relatively pre-
cise, detached explication, but otherwise inexpressible emo-
tions as well. In fact, words are often chosen as much for
their emotive as their cognitive force. We cannot sanction
the view that the Constitution, while solicitous of the cogni-
tive content of individual speech, has little or no regard for
that emotive function which, practically speaking, may often
be the more important element of the overall message sought
to be communicated.8°
The duality of commercial and noncommercial speech becomes
critically important when overlaid with the Court's treatment of
false or misleading speech. With regard to noncommercial speech,
the government traditionally is restrained from acting as the arbiter
of truth and falsity.81  Moreover, the state may not punish its citi-
zens for disseminating false noncommercial information. 2 Thus,
speech.").
77 See, e.g., Nordyke v. Santa Clara County, 110 F.3d 707, 712 (9th Cir. 1997) (striking
down a fairground lease term prohibiting gun shows, the appellate court described this Court's
commercial speech cases, concluding that "the Central Hudson is not easy to apply"); see also
Commodity Trend Serv., Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 149 F.3d 679, 684 (7th
Cir. 1998) (quoting Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. at 419).
78 Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 184 (1999); see also
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525,554 (2001).
79 See Kozinski & Banner, supra note 19, at 631.
80 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971).
81 See, e.g., Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) ("[T]he First
Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message,
its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.").
82 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72 (1964) ("[E]rroneous statement
is inevitable in free debate, and ... it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to
have the 'breathing space' that they 'need ... to survive."'); see also Morales v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 389-90 (1992) (noting the difficulty in regulating only "false"
advertising); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777, 783 (1978) (holding that
corporations enjoy the same degree of constitutional protection as individuals for direct com-
ments on public issues; thus, corporate sponsored editorials which address the merits of pending
legislation should not be subject to government regulation of falsity); Licata & Co. v. Goldberg,
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if courts cannot distinguish between commercial and noncommer-
cial speech, punishments for false speech are likely to be arbitrar-
ily imposed-an unacceptable result in a society which values
fairness and due process, and abhors selective enforcement of the
law. 83  Whenever the boundaries are uncertain, there is an in-
creased probability of abuse.84 The targets of prosecution or of
private attorney general lawsuits (such as permitted by California's
Unfair Competition Law) may be determined simply by who has
the biggest axe to grind and the resources to pursue it.
8 5
812 F. Supp. 403, 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) ("Robust debate between competitors ... [is] encour-
aged as part of the hurly-burly inherent in a free market system, and indeed an open society.");
Procter & Gamble Co. v. Chesebrough-Pond's Inc., 588 F. Supp. 1082, 1093-94 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff'd, 747 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1984) ("Courts are not always able to determine whether an adver-
tising claim is true or false."); cf. Lebron v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 749 F.2d
893, 898-99 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (suggesting that the First Amendment prohibits any governmental
assessment of the deceptiveness of political speech); Rudisill v. Flynn, 619 F.2d 692, 694 (7th
Cir. 1980) ("We do not regard intentional misstatements of fact made during an election cam-
paign as 'election frauds' in the ordinary sense. The merits of a ballot issue are matters reserved
for public and private discussion and debate between opponents and proponents. It is for the
voters, not this court to decide whom to elect and what ballot issues to approve.").
83 See, e.g., Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 867-68 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (striking
down the university's speech code as overbroad, vague, and susceptible to selective enforce-
ment); Kenneth Lasson, Political Correctness Askew: Excesses in the Pursuit of Minds and
Manners, 63 TENN. L. REV. 689, 718 (1996) (some speech codes have been "struck down as
being unconstitutionally broad or vague in prohibiting speech that would otherwise be protected,
or as being too arbitrary in the manner in which punishments are meted out"). Professor Mi-
chael Dorf argues that the risk of an overbroad statute cloaking illegitimate ends or unbridled
prosecutorial discretion extends beyond the First Amendment rights and other fundamental
rights. Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV.
235, 261-62 n.96 (1994). He notes that the Supreme Court has held that the danger of selective
enforcement is a significant reason for the Due Process Clause's prohibition on vague. Id.
("[T]he void for vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with
sufficient definiteness . . . in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement."); see also Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971) ("[Tlhis ordi-
nance is unconstitutionally vague because it subjects the exercise of the right to assembly to an
unascertainable standard, and unconstitutionally broad because it authorizes the punishment of
constitutionally protected conduct.").
94 See Lobbying by Private Foundations, 53 Fed. Reg. 51826, 51827 (1988) (codified at
26 C.F.R. pts. 1, 53, 56) ("Congress was aware... of the belief that the vague standards of the
substantial part test tended to create uncertainty and allow subjective and selective enforce-
ment."); James Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, The First Amendment Needs No Reform: Pro-
tecting Liberty from Campaign Finance "Reformers", 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 785, 832 (2002)
(noting in a critique of campaign finance regulation "[a] blurring of the lines between express
advocacy and issue advocacy poses the identical threats of uncertain prohibitions and selective
enforcement regardless of whether the communications are coordinated"); Eugene Volokh, How
Harassment Law Restricts Free Speech, 47 RUTGERs L. REV. 563, 568-69 (1995).
85 See Karen C. Daly, Balancing Act: Teachers' Classroom Speech and the First Amend-
ment, 30 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 60 n.322 (2001) (noting that most controversies over a teacher's
speech begin with a single complaint, and that other teachers using the same speech may or may
not be targeted with complaints; moreover, if many teachers engage in the same speech, it may
be evidence that the teachers are not under notice that the particular speech at issue is prohib-
ited).
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III. SPEAKERS WITH COMMERCIAL CONCERNS PLAY
AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN A FREE SOCIETY
Expressive associations have a long-standing, constitutionally
protected role as part of the political process. 86  Corporate speech
is one form of expressive association.87 The Court acknowledges
this for media corporations,88 but then makes an inappropriate con-
tent-based distinction to give other types of corporations lesser
protection.89 Corporations are not an alien force requiring a barrier
to protect the political process from its influence. The open politi-
cal process of a democratic society is the clash of all sorts of dif-
ferent viewpoints, many driven by economic interests and many
driven by noneconomic interests. To allow entrenched politicians
to pick and choose which among the disparate interests will be
hobbled is antidemocratic. 90 The fact that private associations
have been a dynamic and sometimes positive influence on politics
over our nation's history does not mean that modern economic or-
ganizations are not.91
86 See Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 294 (1981).
87 See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (plural-
ity opinion) ("Corporations ... contribute to the 'discussion, debate, and the dissemination of
information and ideas' that the First Amendment seeks to foster.").
88 See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 667.
Media companies can run procandidate editorials as easily as nonmedia corporations
can pay for advertisements. Candidates can be just as grateful to media companies
as they can be to corporations and unions. In terms of "the corrosive and distorting
effects" of wealth accumulated by corporations that has "little or no correlation to
the public's support for the corporation's political ideas" ... there is no distinction
between a media corporation and a nonmedia corporation. Media corporations are
influential. There is little doubt that the editorials and commentary they run can af-
fect elections. Nor is there any doubt that media companies often wish to influence
elections. One would think that the New York Times fervently hopes that its en-
dorsement of Presidential candidates will actually influence people.
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 124 S. Ct. 619, 740-41 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted).
89 See Austin, 494 U.S. at 667.
90 See Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 349 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe pros-
pect that voters might be persuaded by... endorsements is not a corruption of the democratic
political process; it is the democratic political process.").
91 See Muir v. Ala. Educ. Television Comm'n, 688 F.2d 1033, 1038 n.12 (5th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1023 (1983) ("Freedom of speech is not good government because it is in
the First Amendment; it is in the First Amendment because it is good government."). However,
in Federal Election Commission v. Beaumont, 123 S. Ct. 2200 (2003), the High Court upheld
the current incarnation of a century-old ban on direct corporate contributions to federal election
campaigns, even when the corporation is a nonprofit, advocacy group without shareholders.
The Court permitted Congress to regulate these contributions in response to fears of "war-chest
corruption" and the corporation's potential for circumventing other campaign finance laws as a
conduit for contributions. Id. at 2207, 2209. Justices Thomas and Scalia dissented, opining in a
single paragraph that the law should be reviewed under strict scrutiny and could not pass muster
under that demanding standard. Id. at 2212 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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The First Amendment is first and foremost a denial of gov-
ernment power. It is not a catalogue of favored and disfa-
vored forms of speech. It is by no means a vehicle for ren-
dering a prejudice against profit-motivated speech the su-
preme law of the land. It leaves to each of us the choice of
what and how to communicate and whether to communicate
at all. There exists no lawful "preferred" mix of ideas, no re-
quired speech or disallowed speech. No free speech and
press model is mandated by the First Amendment. Rather,
each model is descriptive of that government-free environ-
ment mandated by the First Amendment.
92
Free speech adds three types of value to society. First, free speech
bolsters the pursuit of truth. Second, free speech provides a check
on other sources of power, thus supporting a stable, progressive,
uncorrupt, and responsive democratic government.93 Third, free
speech serves values of self-realization, personal and cultural de-
velopment, autonomy, and autonomous decision-making. 94 Ac-
cordingly, the First Amendment guarantees that citizens may
speak, publish, and join together in groups to engage in political
activity to try to achieve the substantive ends they deem desir-
able. 95 They may attempt to persuade others and to acquire politi-
cal influence, and the government may not interfere with, punish,
repress, or otherwise impede their efforts.96
Corporations add to societal values in numerous ways. Cor-
porations can give money to organizations having no relation to
their business. There is a spectrum of causes for the public good
to which corporations contribute with little or no unique self--or
class-interest. 97  They are significant underwriters of charitable
92 JONATHAN W. EMORD, CONTRIVED DISTINCTIONS: THE DOCTRINE OF COMMERCIAL
SPEECH IN FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE (Cato Policy Analysis No. 161, 1991), available
at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-161 html (last visited Apr. 16, 2004).
93 See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) ("[A] major purpose of [the First]
Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.").
94 See R. George Wright, Why Free Speech Cases Are as Hard (And as Easy) as They Are,
68 TENN. L. REV. 335, 337-38 (2001).
95 LILLIAN R. BEVIER, CAMPAIGN FINANCE "REFORM" PROPOSALS: A FIRST AMEND-
MENT ANALYSIS (1997) (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), and NAACP v. Ala-
bama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-282.html (last visited
Apr. 16, 2004).
96 Id. (citing Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939)).
97 Programming produced by the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) has long been un-
derwritten by corporations, often with little connection between the corporate mission and the
underwritten shows. For example, ExxonMobile underwrote "Masterpiece Theater" for nine
years. General Electric is underwriting "Freedom: A History of US." Chubb Insurance under-
writes Antiques Roadshow, and Volkswagon is the sole corporate sponsor of a seven part series
on "The Blues." Elizabeth Jensen, When Image Isn't Enough, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2003, at El,
available at 2003 WL 2381973.
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and cultural activities. For example, Consolidated Edison in New
York supports a diverse assortment of charitable, public health,
environmental, and cultural organizations: American Museum of
Natural History; American Red Cross; Arts & Business Council;
Brooklyn Philharmonic; Channel Thirteen; Cooper Union; Fresh
Air Fund; Manhattan College; New York Blood Center; New York
Botanical Garden; New York Hall of Science; New York Public
Library; Queens Theatre in the Park; United Way; Wildlife Con-
servation Society; and the YMCA.98
Moreover, corporations play an important role in diffusing
and checking societal and governmental accumulations of power. 99
For example, the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers As-
sociation ("PhRMA") provides expert testimony before Congress
and the Food and Drug Administration relating to pending legisla-
tion that impacts the availability and cost of pharmaceuticals. °°
Viewed in this light, governmental suppression of corporate
speech takes on potentially ominous implications for avoiding the
centralization of political power. One can never be sure whether
restrictions on corporate expression are in reality nothing more
than governmental attempts to curb or intimidate a potential rival
for societal authority. Hence, excluding corporate speech from the
First Amendment's reach would almost inevitably have a detri-
mental impact on the most fundamental values underlying the pro-
tection of free speech. 101
A message's overall nature may change when the messenger
changes; similarly, the degree of effectiveness and credibility may
change depending on the source. 10 2 The same statement from dif-
ferent speakers may constitute a different message. As the Court
has noted, an "espousal of socialism may carry different implica-
tions when displayed on the grounds of a stately mansion than
when pasted on a factory wall or an ambulatory sandwich
98 See Con Edison, News and Highlights, Strategic Partnerships, at http://www.coned.
corn/partnerships/news highlights.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2004).
99 See David Millon, The Sherman Act and the Balance of Power, 61 S. CAL. L. REV.
1219, 1243 (1988) ("Commercial opportunity meant more than just personal independence.
Equally important, it guaranteed a balance of economic power in society.").
10°See generally Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America website, at
http://www.phrma.org (containing press releases describing testimony and comments to agen-
cies).
101 See Martin H. Redish & Howard M. Wasserman, What's Good for General Motors:
Corporate Speech and the Theory of Free Expression, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 235, 264 (1998).
10 2 See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791-92 (stating that the people
in a democracy "may consider.., the source and credibility of the advocate"); C. Edwin Baker,
Turner Broadcasting: Content-Based Regulation of Persons and Presses, 1994 SUP. CT. REV.
57, 65 ("Many listeners find that the identity of the source affects the worth or at least their
evaluation of the speech.").
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board."' 3 Corporate speech thus provides both a message and a
messenger of value to public debate.
Corporate speech counteracts the dominance of the few media
megacorporations, 1°4 and of government officials who can com-
mand free access to the press'0 5 and other means of disseminating
information simply by virtue of their position. 06 Given that most
individual citizens either cannot, or choose not to, compete in pub-
lic debates dominated by the press and the government, adding a
component of corporate speech provides "a more diverse discourse
than a debate dominated by two, so long as the third does not
merely echo the others.' 0 7  Government may not silence one side
of a public debate because it disagrees with it.'0 8  Relegating
speech by those who have commercial interests to second-class
status silences one side of debate in just this way. In so doing, the
government creates a bias in the democratic process designed to
achieve the state's desired result, which is exactly the opposite of
what the First Amendment is intended to do.' °9 Moreover, silenc-
ing commercial speech "for the good of the citizenry" reflects a
patronizing and offensive mistrust of citizens' ability to make per-
sonal choices based on the greatest range of information."0
103 City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 56-57 (1994); see also Redish & Wasserman, su-
pra note 101, at 257.
04 See Matthew Benjamin, Fewer Voices, Fewer Choices?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
June 9, 2003, at 29 (noting that the four big network owners are "News Corp., Walt Disney,
General Electric, and Viacom, all of which also own cable channels as well as substantial num-
bers of TV stations. Disney and Viacom have large radio holdings, too, while News Corp. owns
the New York Post and is about to acquire DirecTV satellite television").
05 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 663, 686 (1997) (noting that incumbents enjoy publicity from free press coverage of their
activities).
106Jd. (referring to the franking privilege and constituent service as a means of delivering
benefits); see also MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW AND GOV-
ERNMENT IN AMERICA 6-9 (1983); David Shelledy, Autonomy, Debate, and Corporate Speech,
18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 541,571-72 (1991).
107 Shelledy, supra note 106, at 571-72.
108 See, e.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Police Dep't of Chi-
cago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).109 See Martin H. Redish, First Amendment Theory and the Demise of the Commercial
Speech Distinction: The Case of the Smoking Controversy, 24 N. KY. L. REV. 553, 580 (1997)
[hereinafter Smoking Controversy]; see also Weinstein, supra note 32, at 1103 (arguing that
when free speech is tied to democracy, "the government must treat each of us, in our capacities
as the ultimate source of political authority, as equal and rational agents").
110 Weinstein, supra note 32, at 1104-06. Professor Baker argues that corporate speech is
unworthy of protection because (1) while corporations are created by people, they are not them-
selves "flesh and blood," and (2) corporate participation in public debate would "distort public
discourse." C. Edwin Baker, Paternalism, Politics, and Citizen Freedom: The Commercial
Speech Quandary in Nike, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1161, 1176-77. But to deny the people
who comprise the corporate entity is to demand a legal fiction. Consider: Could Phillip Knight,
in his personal capacity, write a letter to the editor extolling Nike's virtues? Sure, but would
anyone believe that Mr. Knight's views bore no relation to his position in the company? Or
would Professor Baker argue that officers or employees could not speak out to defend their
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The Supreme Court is not unfamiliar with the types of debates
spawned by commercial enterprises. For example, in Bose Corp.
v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc.,' i the Court held that
an article in Consumer Reports making unflattering comments
about stereo speakers was entitled to full First Amendment protec-
tion. As a matter of constitutional law, it makes no sense to hold
that the assertions in Consumer Reports Magazine are so much
more objectively verifiable and valuable to society than Bose's
press releases in response to those same magazine articles.11 2 Yet,
under the California Supreme Court's version of the commercial
speech doctrine, the former receive full First Amendment protec-
tion while the latter do not. 
113
Worse, by permitting restrictions on commercial speech, the
Court assumes that consumers are unable to separate the wheat
from the chaff. There are two problems with this approach. First,
consumers frequently demonstrate their ability to view corporate
speech with an awareness of the self-interested source of the in-
formation. For example, a marketing trend arose in the 1980s and
company because the public would not perceive them to be acting as individuals, but as corpo-
rate spokespeople? If the people most knowledgeable about corporate facts and positions can-
not express them, the conversation is limited to those who either do not know the facts and/or do
not support the corporate point of view. Professor Baker further argues "[t]here is no reason to
grant such an entity influence or empowerment in the public sphere." Id. at 1176 (first empha-
sis added). This is not a question of "grant" or "not grant." Corporations-and the individuals
who run them, have stock in them, and are otherwise interested in their affairs-will influence
the public debate regardless of whether they do it straightforwardly or with a certain degree of
subterfuge. Professor Baker's approach would lead us perilously close to the swamp currently
inhabited by campaign finance reform statutes and the decisions interpreting them; which is to
say, no campaign finance "reform" has ever succeeded in removing-or even substantially
reducing-money in politics. They simply demand greater creativity. See, e.g.,Thomas B.
Edsall, Liberal Donors Back Anti-Bush Groups: FEC Regulatory Plan Targets Efforts to Fill
Vacuum Created by Soft-Money Ban, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 2004, at A8 ("Major liberal donors
are demonstrating their willingness to fund a new shadow Democratic Party, according to re-
ports filed yesterday by a network of nominally independent organizations committed to defeat-
ing President Bush in November."). Distortion comes from subterfuge, not from straightfor-
ward expression of a position, where the listener can both consider the message and the messen-
ger. Professor Robert Sitkoff argues that
the bad politics argument amounts to nothing more than a complaint that people with
more money can buy more speech. But that is no reason to limit all corporate politi-
cal speech. It is rather an argument either for limiting the political speech of all the
wealthy, including people and other business associations in addition to corpora-
tions, or for subsidizing the political speech of the poor.
Robert H. Sitkoff, Corporate Political Speech, Political Extortion, and the Competition for
Corporate Charters, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1103, 1108-09 (2002).
"'1466 U.S. 485 (1984).
112 Consumer Reports is not immune to charges that it engages in biased reporting. Suzuki
Motor Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 330 F.3d 1110, 1133 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding
that a jury could plausibly determine that the publisher of Consumer Reports had a financial
motive to falsify test results related to the propensity of a Suzuki Samurai to rollover on sharp
turns).
113 Smoking Controversy, supra note 109, at 568-69.
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1990s in which many companies sought to profit from appearing
ecologically sensitive by "frantically relabeling, repackaging, and
repositioning products" as ecologically sensitive or environmen-
tally sound. 114 In 1990, a survey noted that 26% of all new house-
hold items "boasted that they were ozone-friendly, recyclable, bio-
degradable, compostable, or some other shade of green.""' 5 De-
spite these claims, an environmental research organization found
that "nearly 47% of consumers dismiss environmental claims as
'mere gimmickry." 1 16
Given the time and space limitations of the various media out-
lets, advertising copy is necessarily incomplete. Most advertise-
ments contain more than one message with different meanings to
different people.' 17  "Consumers are wary whenever they discern
that the self-interest of the advertiser would be served by their own
uncritical belief in what the advertiser asserts.""
8
14 David Hoch and Robert Franz, Eco-porn Versus the Constitution: Commercial Speech
and the Regulation of Environmental Advertising, 58 ALB. L. REV. 441, 442 (1994) (citing
Jaclyn Fierman, The Big Muddle in Green Marketing, FORTUNE, June 3, 1991, at 91).
'1 Id.
116 Id.
117 See Richard Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive Advertising, 65 B.U. L. REV. 657, 672-76
(1985).
118 Lillian R. BeVier, Competitor Suits for False Advertising under Section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act: A Puzzle in the Law of Deception, 78 VA. L. REV. 1, 8 (1992); cf Dennis Crouch,
The Social Welfare of Advertising to Children, 9 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 179, 187-89
(2002):
If advertising that provides valuable information for the consumer increases
the efficiency of the market, deceptive advertising correspondingly decreases market
efficiency by taking information away from the consumer. When a consumer is mis-
led, his search costs needed to find the good he desires may increase and he may
purchase goods for prices above his utility or alter his behavior from what it would
have been without the deceptive advertising. In addition, the existence of false ad-
vertising causes consumers to become skeptical of advertisements in general or a
particular class of goods or advertisements. This skepticism leads to market ineffi-
ciency because the truthful content within advertisements is no longer trusted, leav-
ing consumers without the information they need. In addition, it takes energy to act
as a skeptic. Therefore, when consumers become skeptics, advertising in general
becomes less valuable.
As with any activity, there is likely to be an "optimal" level of false advertis-
ing. False advertising can be over-deterred and under-deterred. While under-
deterrence would lead to too much false advertising, over-deterrence can lead to ex-
ternalities by trying to avoid false advertising. For example, a harsh penalty for false
advertising could result in over-precaution by advertisers. In other words, firms will
take excessive measures to avoid committing an over-deterred activity. In the con-
text of over-deterred false advertising, a firm may stop advertising altogether or
avoid giving any information in advertisements in order to avoid a strict penalty for
false advertising. The result is a dearth of information in the hands of consumers.
Therefore, it becomes a tradeoff between the amount of false advertising that society
is willing to tolerate and the amount of information desired. Although consumer
skepticism creates inefficiencies, it could be optimal to have some level of consumer
skepticism rather than going to the expense of eliminating all false or misleading ad-
vertising.
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People are not only quite capable of looking out for their own
interests, but are also capable of organizing counter-speech to cor-
porate communications. Frequently, this takes the form of boy-
cotts. 19 Boycotting is such a popular tactic 120 that an organization
called "Boycott Watch" keeps track of all the major boycott ac-
tions.1 21 Boycotting also has the approval of the Supreme Court as
a counter-speech tactic.1
22
Second, denying full protection to commercial speech for this
reason is underinclusive. Rational people need to listen to speech
from non-commercial sources with an equal amount of skepticism;
even core political speech can be rife with falsehoods and mislead-
ing statements.123  Most, if not all, speakers have some self-
l19 See, e.g., CNN, Environmental Campaigners Take Aim at Oil Companies (May 30,
2002), at http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/europe/05/30/oil.environment.groups.glb/index.
html (stating that Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, and World Wildlife Fund urge the boycott
of oil companies, specifically identifying their action as a response to corporate political contri-
butions); Jenny Strasburg, Ban on Israeli Goods Has Shoppers in Uproar: Some Demand Rain-
bow Co-op End Boycott, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 5, 2002, at BI (noting that a grocery store's boycott
of Israeli products led to counter-boycott by local Jewish community).
120 See Andre L. Smith, Comment, Consumer Boycotts Versus Civil Litigation: A Rudi-
mentary Efficiency Analysis, 43 How. L.J. 213, 229 (2000):
United States' history is replete with groups redressing grievances or lobbying for
rights through the use of consumer boycotts. A defining moment in American his-
tory, the Boston Tea Party, can be characterized as a boycott against the British...
[emanating] 'from a desire by the colonists to protest Britain's imposition of 'taxa-
tion without representation."' Since then, and with considerable usage by labor un-
ions, boycotts have been a hallmark of American social movements.
Id. (citations omitted).
121 See Boycott Watch, at http://www.boycottwatch.org.
122 See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 909-10 (1982) ("Petitioners
admittedly sought to persuade others to join the boycott through social pressure and the 'threat'
of social ostracism. Speech does not lose its protected character, however, simply because it
may embarrass others or coerce them into action."); see also Redgrave v. Boston Symphony
Orchestra, Inc., 855 F.2d 888, 904 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1043 (1989) ("The
freedom of mediating institutions, newspapers, universities, political associations, and artistic
organizations and individuals themselves to pick and choose between ideas, to winnow, to criti-
cize, to investigate, to elaborate, to protest, to support, to boycott, and even to reject is essential
if 'free speech' is to prove meaningful."); cf James D. Hurwitz, Abuse of Governmental Proc-
esses, the First Amendment, and the Boundaries of Noerr, 74 GEO. L.J. 65, 115 (1985) (noting
different antitrust implications depending on whether a boycott has an overriding political pur-
pose targeting government versus economic manipulation directed solely at a private actor).
123 Courts are unwilling to permit lawsuits challenging broken campaign promises or even
deliberate falsehoods uttered in the heat of a political campaign. Instead, the courts entrust the
voters with the responsibility of sifting through competing political statements to discern the
truth. See Williams v. Police Jury of Concordia Parish, 107 So. 126, 129 (La. 1926) (refusing to
give legal weight to a promise made to voters by supporters of a bond measure; finding that
"[t]he breach of such promises is to be reckoned with at the ballot box and not in the courts of
this state"); City of Farmers Branch v. Hawnco, Inc., 435 S.W.2d 288, 292 (Tex. Civ. App.
1968) (plaintiffs tried to enjoin city council from considering changes to a zoning ordinance
because certain officials had campaigned on a platform against such changes; the court held that
elected officials cannot be precluded from voting on an issue due to a previously made cam-
paign promise, but "[iun any event public officials are not legally required to keep their cam-
paign promises and whether they do or not they are answerable to the voters at the next elec-
tion"); see generally Stephen D. Sencer, Note, Read My Lips: Examining the Legal Implications
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interest, whether financial or personal, in having their views ac-
cepted by their audience. This self-interest does not diminish the
First Amendment protection sheltering "political candidates seek-
ing elective office, consumer organizations seeking increased con-
sumer protection, welfare recipients seeking increases in benefits,
farmers seeking subsidies, and American auto workers seeking
higher tariffs on foreign automobiles."' 124 Instead, First Amend-
ment values of truth-seeking and democratic participation are ad-
vanced when the substance of the debate contains elements from
all interested parties. The simple fact that all sides of a debate can
participate is "likely to spur expression's thoroughness, thought-
fulness, and breadth of distribution. To exclude all self-interested
expression from the scope of the constitutional guarantee, then,
would effectively gut free speech protection."'
125
In fact, the blurry, shifting line between political and com-
mercial speech defies capture and definition. While commercial
speech "may not affect how people are governed as directly as po-
litical speech does, it indirectly influences people's attitudes and
values about how they should be governed."' 126 Furthermore, the
free flow of commercial speech allows advertisers and consumers
to economize their time and effort in deciding how to allocate their
resources. 127
The operation of commercial enterprises and the quality of
their products and services give rise to inescapable social and
political implications. The very fact that those who seek to
reduce free speech protection for "commercial speech" are
today so anxious to exclude from that less protected category
expression about such products and services other than ad-
vertising tends to confirm the inherently ideological message
of all commercial speech.
28
Reducing the First Amendment protection of corporate speech
threatens to chill protected speech especially when a business has
to respond to adverse publicity. Newsmagazines such as ABC's
PrimeTime Live or public interest organizations have the luxury of
spending as much time and money as they wish on investigative
of Knowingly False Campaign Promises, 90 MICH. L. REV. 428 (1991) (discussing the implica-
tions of George H. Bush's 1998 campa;,-n promise to not raise taxes).
124 Redish & Wasserman, supra note 101, at 269-70.
1 Id.
126 Andrew S. Gollin, Comment, Improving the Odds of the Central Hudson Balancing
Test: Restricting Commercial Speech as a Last Resort, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 873, 915-16 (1998)
(quoting MICHAEL G. GARTNER, ADVERTISING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 9 (1989)).
127 Id at 270.
128 Smoking Controversy, supra note 109, at 578.
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reporting before airing adverse publicity. 129 By contrast, an effec-
tive corporate response must be made almost immediately to avert
or minimize harm, or simply to avoid being defined by its detrac-
tors. The Supreme Court has previously exhibited concern for cor-
porations placed in the position of having to respond to the speech
of others. In Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Com-
mission,13  the issue was whether a state regulatory commission
could require a utility company to permit an activist group to use
its billing envelopes to distribute an insert expressing views with
which the utility vehemently disagreed. The plurality found that
the utility would "feel compelled to respond,"'13 1 and characterized
the Commission's order as one that actually "forced a response."'13
2
The California Supreme Court in Kasky failed to consider this
complication when it concluded that the facts underlying Nike's
campaign were "more easily verifiable by the disseminator" and
"less likely to experience a chilling effect from speech regula-
tion." 13 3 "A strict standard of 'absolute truthfulness' means a be-
sieged corporate speaker with little time to investigate allegations
responds at its own risk, creating a 'Hobson's choice' where re-
sponding or not responding carries different but equally serious
consequences.' 34 As Justice Chin noted in a Kasky dissent:
While Nike's critics have taken full advantage of their right
to "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate, the same can-
not be said of Nike, the object of their ire. When Nike tries
to defend itself from these attacks, the majority denies it the
same First Amendment protection Nike's critics enjoy .... t35
129 See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 510-11 (4th Cir. 1999)
(describing at least 7 months of preparation leading to the broadcast of PrimeTime Live excori-
ating Food Lion supermarkets for unsanitary practices). The Center for Science in the Public
Interest has achieved fame for its "exposds" of the evils of ice cream, movie theater popcorn,
and fettuccine alfredo. See, e.g., CSPI, Press Release, Ice Cream Shops Serving Coronaries in
Cones (July 23, 2003), at http://cspinet.org/new/20030723l.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2004).
The public relations industry itself is not immune from investigative reporting designed to place
the industry in a very negative light. See, e.g., JOHN C. STAUBER & SHELDON RAMPTON, Toxic
SLUDGE IS GOOD FOR You!: LIES, DAMN LIES AND THE PUBLIC RELATIONS INDUSTRY (1995)
(analyzing the dangers of the public relations industry).
1-475 U.S. 1 (1986).
31Id. at 15 n.ll.
132 1d. at 16; see also David Graver, Comment, Personal Bodies: A Corporeal Theory of
Corporate Personhood, 6 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 235, 241 (1999) ("The 'chilling' of
corporate speech that an oppositional voice in the envelope might create was deemed a harm not
offset by the increased exchange of ideas that would have been possible in this no-cost public
forum.").
133 Kasky, 45 P.3d at 252-53.
134 Richard 0. Faulk, A Chill Wind Blows: California's Supreme Court Muzzles Corporate
Speech, 15 ANDREWS AIDS L1TIG. REP. 10 (2002).
135Kasky, 45 P.3d at 263 (Chin, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
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Companies-and even entire industries-routinely are called
upon for rapid response to attacks upon their business practices.
For example, the past few year have seen self-proclaimed health
advocates excoriate certain restaurant chains for "supersizing"
meal portions and thus "causing" obesity in their patrons.136  With
accusations multiplying, the National Restaurant Association cre-
ated a "Rapid Response Program" specifically designed to "rebut
denigrating and negative portrayals of the restaurant industry
wherever they occur in the media." 137 Fortune magazine reported
that McDonald's launched a public relations campaign to counter-
act the adverse publicity surrounding the filing of a lawsuit seek-
ing to fault the company for encouraging obesity in children. 138
The article cautions, however, that in California, such defensive
claims that food products can be a part of a nutritious diet may
lead to liability under the Unfair Competition Law.'
39
In each of these instances, the speech uttered by corporations
would not be uttered by anyone else-either because they lack the
information to present it to the public, or because it is not in their
self-interest to present a communication that would undermine
their own messages. The inclusion of the corporate point of view
in ongoing debates thus serves an important public purpose.
IV. CENTRAL HUDSON CANNOT ADEQUATELY PROTECT
THE INTERMINGLED SPEECH PREVALENT IN
MODERN, INNOVATIVE CORPORATE SPEECH
A profit motive, in and of itself, does not render speech un-
protected.14°  Instead, the Supreme Court held in Virginia Phar-
macy that the speech is reduced to less-favored status only when it
136 See Bruce Horovitz, Under Fire, Food Giants Switch to Healthier Fare, USA TODAY,
July 1, 2003, at Cl, available at http://www.usatoday.conlmoney/industries/food/2003-07-01-
junkfood_x.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2004) ("Junk food's best consumers are kids-
increasingly obese kids. So that's not the dinner bell you hear. It's an alarm bell raising Oreo-
size goose bumps for the giant makers of now-unfashionable sugary, fatty and calorie-laden
foods. All are faced with this new reality: As concern about obesity rises, they're within a few
cookie crumbs of becoming the next Big Tobacco for trial lawyers.").
13 7 See National Restaurant Ass'n, Rapid Response Program, at http://www.restaurant.org/
pressroom/rrlist.cfm (last visited Apr. 16, 2004) (posting letters sent to the editors of Smart-
Money Magazine, the Washington Post, the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, USA Today, and others).
138 Roger Parloff, Is Fat the Next Tobacco?: For Big Food, the Supersizing of America is
Becoming a Big Headache, FORTUNE, Jan. 21, 2003, available at http://www.fortune.com/
fortunelarticles/0,15114,409670-2,00.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2004).
1
3 9 Id.; see also Comm. On Children's Television, Inc. v. Gen. Foods Corp., 673 P.2d 660
(Cal. 1983) (permitting consumer group's lawsuit against supermarkets, cereal manufacturer,
and advertising agency to go forward under CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200, where lawsuit
alleged that advertising for Super Sugar Crisp, Cocoa Crispies and similar cereals misled par-
ents and children into thinking these "candy breakfasts" provided a nutritional start to the day).
140Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761-
62 (1976).
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does "no more than propose a commercial transaction."' 4' The
Court has thus far relied on "common sense" to differentiate be-
tween commercial and noncommercial speech. 42 The two "com-
mon sense" distinctions are (1) that commercial speech is more
verifiable than other types of speech; and (2) that commercial
speech is more durable than other types of speech. 43  Given that
these distinctions no longer appear to be a solid foundation for di-
minished constitutional protection, and given the innovative new
methods of advertising and marketing in contemporary society,
reliance on a "common sense" approach can lead only to confu-
sion.
In Bolger v. Youngs Drug Product Corp.,144 the Supreme
Court held that "advertising which 'links a product to a current
public debate' is not thereby entitled to the constitutional protec-
tion afforded noncommercial speech" because "[a]dvertisers
should not be permitted to immunize false or misleading product
information from government regulation simply by including ref-
erences to public issues.' 45  The Court reiterated this holding in
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of
Ohio,'46 in which a lawyer challenged the state supreme court's
ability to sanction him for running deceptive newspaper adver-
tisements for his services in bringing personal injury actions re-
lated to the use of Dalkon Shield contraceptives. Because some of
the advertisements contained statements regarding the legal rights
of persons injured by the Dalkon Shield, the Supreme Court rec-
ognized that such statements "in another context, would be fully
protected speech."147
1411d. at 771 n. 24.
142Id. The American Heritage Dictionary defines "common sense" as "[slound judgment
not based on specialized knowledge; native good judgment." AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTION-
ARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2000), available at http://www.bartleby.com/61/59/
C0515900.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2004). At least one court acknowledges that common
sense is a "hard-to-define virtue." Ala. Great S. R.R. Co. v. Allied Chemical Corp., 501 F.2d
94, 99 (5th Cir. 1974).
143 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24; see also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 n.6 (1980). Both distinctions have been criti-
cized by judges and scholars. See, e.g., Kozinski & Banner, supra note 19, at 635-38 (question-
ing the notion that it is easy to ascertain the truth of commercial speech); Donald E. Lively, The
Supreme Court and Commercial Speech: New Words with an Old Message, 72 MINN. L. REV.
289, 296-97 (1987) (dissecting the weaknesses of the Supreme Court's position on commercial
speech); Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 31-
32 (2000) (applying the overbreadth doctrine to commercial speech).
1463 U.S. 60 (1983).
145 Id. at 68 (quoting Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 563 n.5).
'M471 U.S. 626 (1985).
147.d. at 637 n.7. In deciding whether spreading rumors of a competitor's alleged in-
volvement with Satanism mingled "religious" speech with "commercial speech," the Fifth Cir-
cuit offered the following example to explain how it would approach such a mixture:
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Based on Bolger and Zauderer, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals found that advertisements by rival health care insurance
companies that included information about health care insurance
and delivery-matters indisputably at the center of public debate-
do not escape the commercial speech category.1 48 In each of these
cases, the court suppressed noncommercial speech related to im-
portant public debates for the sole reason that it was coupled with
commercial speech.
49
A. Marketing and Advertising Are No Longer Necessarily
Identifiable or Separable from Noncommercial Speech
As a corollary to the government's ability to regulate com-
mercial transactions, the government also assumes the ability to
regulate commercial speech.15 0  The Court has already conceded
that "commercial speech" is not easily defined. 15 1  These "ambi-
guities" however, threaten to overcome the rest of the category.
A woman who owns a small religious book and music store tells customers
that most rock and roll music is influenced by the devil and that the only kind of
rock music they should buy is "Christian rock," which is, of course, the only kind
she sells. The determination of whether a Lanham Act suit could be brought will
turn on her motivation. Evidence that she started the bookstore because of strongly-
held religious beliefs that Christian books and music need to be made available to
combat the evils of rock and roll and pulp fiction would be compelling evidence of a
primarily religious, rather than economic, motivation for her speech. On the other
hand, evidence showing that she is agnostic and opened the bookstore only after a
case study in her MBA program showed that Christian bookstores can be extremely
profitable when set up in the right locations would be strong evidence that her
speech was economically motivated and thus commercial.
Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 242 F.3d 539, 553 n.28 (5th Cir.), cert. den. 534 U.S.
945 (2001).
148 U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia, 898 F.2d 914, 937 (3d
Cir.), cert. den., 498 U.S. 816 (1990).
149R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), suggests a different approach. In that
case, the Court held that even speech that normally receives less First Amendment protection
may not be regulated in such a way that the state discriminates on the basis of content or view-
point. Id. at 385. A number of lower courts have either applied or considered applying R.A.V.
to content-based commercial speech restrictions. See Valley Broad. Co. v. United States, 107
F.3d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1997) (acknowledging the potential application of R.A.V. to content-
based commercial speech regulation); Homell Brewing Co. v. Brady, 819 F. Supp. 1227, 1232-
33 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (applying both R.A.V. and Central Hudson to speech regulation without
deciding which is required); Citizens United for Free Speech H v. Long Beach Township Bd. of
Comm'rs, 802 F. Supp. 1223, 1232 (D.N.J. 1992) ("It is clear from the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in R.A.V. [], that commercial speech must be protected by the usual strictures against con-
tent-based distinctions.").
I m See Rodney A. Smolla, Information, Imagery, and the First Amendment: A Case for
Expansive Protection of Commercial Speech, 71 TEX. L. REv. 777, 780 (1993).
151 See, e.g., Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 493 (1995) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring) ("[T]he borders of the commercial speech category are not nearly as clear as the Court has
assumed."); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 81 (Stevens, J., concurring)
("[T]he impression that 'commercial speech' is a fairly definite category of communication ...
may not be wholly warranted.").
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The speech in Nike v. Kasky involved press releases, letters to
the editor, letters to university athletic directors and the like de-
scribing Nike's overseas labor practices. 52  Far from the proto-
typical commercial speech of offering to sell X product for Y
price, 53 the speech at issue in the Nike case was intended to reha-
bilitate a corporate image as well as provide information to the
public on a matter of broad concern. 154 Extending the lesser pro-
tection of the commercial speech doctrine to this type of speech
threatens a wide variety of public relations communication. These
include:
"Product placement," an arrangement whereby a movie stu-
dio incorporates certain commercial products into its film in ex-
change for cash or free use of the product. 155  For example, in
1990, Disney reportedly charged advertisers $20,000 to show the
product without comment, $40,000 to show the product and have
an actor mention the product's name, and $60,000 for an actor to
be shown using the product.156 Product placement began in feature
films and television, but other media have followed suit. For ex-
ample, author Beth Ann Herman featured a Maserati in her novel
Power City. The protagonist drives a Maserati whose "V-6 engine
had two turbochargers, 185 horsepower and got up to 60 in under 7
seconds."'157  In exchange, a Beverly Hills Maserati dealership
threw a $15,000 party for Herman that attracted nationwide televi-
sion coverage.15 8  Even record albums are not exempt. Country
music star Barbara Mandrell's album, No Nonsense, was made
with the financial support of the No Nonsense panty-hose manu-
facturer. 1
59
Sponsorships, by which a company underwrites the produc-
tion of a television show, concert, or sporting event. The early
days of television were marked by shows like Texaco Star Thea-
152 Kasky, 45 P.3d at 248.
153 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
761 (1976).
154 Especially for large corporations, the corporate image has a significant impact on sales
and success. Mary Jo Hatch & Majken Schultz, Are the Strategic Stars Aligned for Your Cor-
porate Brand?, 79 HARV. BUS. REV. 128 (2001) ("[C]ompanies with strong corporate brands
can have market values that are more than twice their book values.").
155 See generally Steven L. Snyder, Note, Movies and Product Placement: Is Hollywood
Turning Films into Commercial Speech? 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 301 (1992) (discussing whether
product placement in movies would be categorized as commercial speech by the Supreme
Court).
156 Id. at 305 (citing Ad Follies, ADVERTISING AGE, Dec. 24, 1990, at 24).
157 1d. at 308 n.65 (citing Randall Rothenberg, Now, Novels Are Turning Promotional,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13,1989, at D5).
158 Id.
191d. at 308 n.67 (citing Robert Epstein, Public-Interest Group Tilts at Commercial
Windmills, L.A. TIMES, June 6, 1991, at F7).
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ter. 6° "Soap operas" were so called because they were sponsored
originally by Proctor & Gamble. 16 1 Animal lovers will remember
"Mutual of Omaha's Wild Kingdom."'162  R.J. Reynolds has spon-
sored the Winston Cup series since 1970.163
Testimonials became part of main-stream marketing in the
1920s, when Pond's cold cream paid "Great Ladies" (including
Mrs. Reginald Vanderbilt, Queen Marie of Rumania, and the
Duchess de Richelieu) to sing the praises of the moisturizer in ex-
change for contributions to charity. 164 Lately, however, it is not
necessarily apparent that those giving testimony are paid to tout
the product. For example, actress Kathleen Turner appeared on
CNN in August, 2002, to discuss her struggles with rheumatoid
arthritis. She failed to mention that the makers of Enbrel, a drug
that battles the condition, paid her to appear. 165 Similarly, Lauren
Bacall appeared on "NBC Today," telling the story of a friend who
had gone blind due to macular degeneration and then discussed a
new drug that could prevent blindness from that cause. Novartis,
the maker of the drug, paid for Ms. Bacall's appearance on the
show, a fact revealed to the audience by neither Ms. Bacall nor
NBC.'
66
Music videos also blur the line between commercial and non-
commercial speech. 167  Music itself, of course, is entitled to full
First Amendment protection. 168  A primary function of a music
video is to promote the artist and the song, in hopes of persuading
consumers to buy the album on which the song appears. 69  Yet
160 See Does Product Placement Have To Be Stealth Or Can Sightings Still Make A Good
Impression?, ENT. MARKETING LETrER, July 15, 2001, 2001 WL 8994864 (noting that the
1950s brought such programming as "Kraft Playhouse," "Texaco Star Theater with Milton
Berle," and "Jack Benny Brought To You By Jell-O" and that those companies owned every
commercial (often woven into the content of the show by the host) and some of the program
content).
161 Procter & Gamble, NEW MEDIA AGE, April 11, 2002, at 28.
162 In the age of TiVo, in which viewers can use computer technology to download broad-
casts minus the commercials, advertisers have used product placement and other ways to inter-
ject favorable mentions of their products into the programs themselves. See Daniel Lyons, Play
it Again, TiVo, (Jan. 28, 2003), at http://www.forbes.com/2003/01/28/cz_dl_O128tivo.html.
16 3 See Chris Roush, Red Necks, White Socks, and Blue-Chip Sponsors, Bus. WK., Aug.
15, 1994, at 74.
16 4 See Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Public-
ity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 125, 164-65 (1993).
1 5 Leon Stafford, Use of Stealth Marketing Raises Questions of Ethics, ATLANTA J., Aug.
29, 2002, at El.
166 Id.; see also Melody Peterson, Side Effects of Celebrity Drug Pitches Debated, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 18, 2002, § 3, at 1. In response to public outcry, CNN now requires full disclosure
of commercial endorsements for any guest who appears on the network.
16 7 See Kozinski & Banner, supra note 19, at 641.
'68 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989).169 See Ray Waddell, More On The Way: The Next Generation Of Teen Pop Acts Up-And-
Coming Youths Take 'N Sync's Lead, Hoping To Break Through TV., BILLBOARD, Sept. 2,
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whether the video is treated as lesser-protected commercial speech
is not obvious under the Court's current jurisprudence. The Ken-
tucky Supreme Court, apparently the only court to consider this
issue, held in Montgomery v. Montgomery,170 that:
While music videos are not produced primarily for the sale of
the video but, rather, the underlying song, this does not strip
them of their First Amendment protection. Music videos are
in essence mini-movies that often require the same level of
artistic and creative input from the performers, actors, and di-
rectors as is required in the making of motion pictures.
Moreover, music videos are aired on television not as adver-
tisements but as the main attraction, the airing of which, con-
sequently, is supported by commercial advertisements. Sim-
ply put, the commercial nature of music videos does not de-
prive them of constitutional protection.
This holding provoked a dissent that seems equally plausible:
A music video stands to an album the same way that a movie
"trailer" or "teaser" stands in relation to a movie; it repre-
sents an attempt to entice a customer to purchase the right to
hear or see the larger work. Indeed, music videos are "dou-
bly" commercial speech. MTV, VH1, the Nashville Net-
work, and other music-video cable channels select and show
the videos that they believe will generate the highest advertis-
ing revenue. The video channels' unwillingness to broadcast
controversial materials-materials likely to spook boycott-
wary advertisers-provide [sic] additional evidence of the es-
sentially commercial nature of the undertaking.'17
The disagreement between the majority and dissent in Montgomery
is significant only because the categorization of the video impacts
the level of protection to which it is entitled under the First
Amendment.
"Virtual advertising" is a form of digital technology that al-
lows advertisers to insert computer-generated brand names, logos,
or animated images into previously recorded television programs
or movies. 17 2 It uses computers to place still or video images into
2000, at 1 (noting the impact of video exposure on album sales). Another function is to sell a
movie in which the song appears. For example, the videos featuring songs from the soundtrack
of Moulin Rouge had heavy rotation on MTV, which contributed to the number of tickets sold at
the box office. Glorida Goodale, Movie Musicals are Back, but Think MTV, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Mar. 21, 2002, at 1 (2002).
17060 S.W.3d 524, 529 (2001).
171 Id. at 534 (Keller, J., dissenting).
1
72Askan Deutsch, Sports Broadcasting and Virtual Advertising: Defining the Limits of
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live video broadcasts in real time so that they look as if they are
part of the original scene. 173 For example, several Major League
Baseball teams have made use of virtual advertisements along the
wall behind home plate.1 74  Virtual advertising blurs the line be-
tween television programming and commercials.
1 75
"Stealth" or "guerilla" marketing uses undercover actors to
promote a product without the public being aware that the actors
are paid by the product's manufacturer. 176 For example, the United
States arm of Sony Ericsson Mobile Communications Ltd. hired
men and women to pose as tourists at tourist attractions in New
York City, then ask passersby to take their picture with Sony's
new phone/digital camera. 177 Sony also hired attractive women to
sit at opposite ends of a bar in a nightclub and play a computer
game on their phones while engaging other patrons in conversation
about their cool new toy. Under no circumstances are the actors
supposed to tell the passersby or club patrons that they are em-
ployed by Sony. 78 Moreover, the actors do not make any type of
sales pitch, they simply demonstrate the product and make flatter-
ing comments about it.1 79 Similarly, the public relations firm rep-
resenting a flavored-water brand dispatched young women fitting
the target demographic to trendy Manhattan bars and clubs to be
seen drinking the specific brand and making favorable comments
about it to unsuspecting bar patrons.
1 80
This type of marketing-a new-fangled take on the old-
fashioned whisper campaign-is not restricted to high-tech gadg-
Copyright Law and the Law of Unfair Competition, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 41, 42 (2000).
173 Id.174 Id. (citing Stuart Elliott, Real or Virtual? You Call It, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1999, at C1).
For example, televised San Francisco Giants games on the Fox Sports Network frequently fea-
ture virtual ads touting Fox network programming. Each inning, the wall behind home plate
promotes a different show.
175 1d. at 44.
176 Daniel Eisenberg, It's an Ad, Ad, Ad, Ad World; As Conventional Methods Lose Their
Punch, More Marketers Are Going Undercover to Reach Consumers, TIME, Sept. 2, 2002, at 38.
177 Suzanne Vranica, Advertising: That Guy Showing Off His Hot New Phone May Be a
Shill, WALL ST. J., July 31, 2002, at B1.
179 Id.
179 Id.
180 See Michael Harrelson, The Fat Man Sings: Meet the 300-Pound Guerrilla of Under-
cover Marketing, NIGHTCLUB & BAR MAG., Feb. 2002, at http://www.nightclub.commagazine/
February02/cover.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2004) (profiling Jonathan Ressler, CEO of Big Fat,
Inc., a public relations firm that is at the vanguard of undercover marketing techniques); see also
Ed Brown, Hold the Olives: Martini Marketing, FORTUNE, Mar. 2, 1998, at 37 (describing how
Hennessey recruited hip young barhoppers to drink "Hennessey martinis" and other cognac
drinks undercover at trendy bars during a five year campaign to reach 21-32 year old drinkers);
Michelle Goldberg, Confessions of an Undercover Drink Fink, SALON, Dec. 9, 1997, at
http://www.salon.com/medial1997/12/09media.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2004) (giving a first-
hand account of methods used to sell cognac martinis without expressly offering to conduct a
commercial transaction).
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ets and liquor. Record companies may plant attractive young
women in record shops, paid to notice the album in a customer's
hand and helpfully suggest other artists the customer may like.
81
Scooter companies pay college students to hang outside coffee
shops, striking up conversations with customers and casually men-
tioning their new rides. 82  Children are given copies of hot new
portable video games, and are urged to bring them to class and
show all their friends. 1
83
Providing helpful advice (while selling a little something on
the side) is also a time-honored method of marketing' 84 that is
evolving into a particularly powerful tool on the Internet. Using
this method, an entrepreneur seeks out chat groups on the Internet
that discuss issues related to what he has to sell. For example,
someone who wants to sell bookkeeping software will find (e.g.,
through Yahoogroups) groups of people who talk about finances.
He will "lurk" long enough to get a feel for the group's discus-
sions, and then start contributing. He will spend the bulk of his
time joining in the discussion and some percentage correctly an-
swering questions related to his product. Each of his posts will
link to his own webpage where he offers software for sale. After
becoming a trusted member of the group, he will find occasional
opportunities to suggest a "meeting" via private e-mail to discuss
how the software can meet a particular person's special needs.
185
Another common incarnation of this technique is found on
websites geared toward parents, mothers in particular. Baby food
manufacturers have websites chock full of helpful information as
to when a baby should achieve developmental milestones, advice
on how to encourage a baby to eat new foods, health advice for the
expectant and breastfeeding mother, and so on. Some even have a
doctor on staff to answer e-mail inquiries. 86 Of course, the web-
181 Thomas Nord, Stealth Marketing-Is It the Next Big Thing or Just a Big Fat Flop?,
COURIER-JOURNALCOM, Aug. 3, 2001, at http://www.courier-joumal.com/features/columns/
popculture/fe200l0803pop.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2004).
182 Gerry Khermouch & Jeff Green, Buzz Marketing, BUSINESSWEEK, July 30, 2001, at 54.
183 Id. at 55.
184 For example, magazines targeted to homemakers (e.g., Better Homes and Gardens, La-
dies Home Journal) frequently contain single or multi-page advertisements or "supplements"
that contain helpful hints for cleaning, child-rearing, and related concerns amidst promotions for
the advertisers' products (which are especially designed to ease the burdens of those cleaning
and child-rearing concerns).
185 Rex Tincher, Stealth Marketing in Usenet News Groups, at http://www.tincher.to/
stealth.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2004).
186 For example, Earth's Best organic baby food provides the services of an obstetri-
cian/gynecologist and a pediatrician to answer consumers' questions online regarding every-
thing from fertility and pregnancy to teething, allergies and immunization. See The Doctor's
Corner, at http://www.earthsbest.commd-corner/doctorscorner.html (last visited Apr. 16,
2004).
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sites also provide information for purchasing products, but one
may peruse the sites at length without ever making a purchase.
1 87
Websites as commercial speech have not yet generated much case-
law, 88 but, especially as regards lawyer advertising, they have
generated some law review articles concerned about whether law
firms' websites are subject to state rules regarding solicitation.'89
B. Speech Intended to Bolster a Corporate Image Should Be
Fully Protected Under the First Amendment
Corporate image advertising "describes the corporation itself,
its activities or its views, but does not explicitly describe any
products or services sold by the corporation."'' 9 There are, gener-
ally, two types of image advertising. The first is advertising that
treats the company itself as a product to be sold. For example,
lumber giant Weyerhaueser has been reviled by environmentalists
for clear-cutting certain forest areas.' 91 Promoting its image as a
responsible steward of the earth, Weyerhauser publicized its part-
187 See, e.g., Website for Gerber products, at http://www.gerber.com/main.asp (last visited
Apr. 16, 2004) (pointing readers to information about nutritional development, new products,
and "expert advice, anytime, day or night"); Website for Evenflo products, at
http://www.evenflo.com/yb/index.phtml (last visited Apr. 16, 2004) (containing information
about pregnancy, introducing solids, better bottle-feeding and factors to consider when purchas-
ing a breast pump).
'8 One example is Ford Motor Co. v. Tex. DOT, 264 F.3d 493, 505 (5th Cir. 2001), in
which Ford challenged a Texas law prohibiting the sale of used vehicles via a website as violat-
ing its First Amendment right to speech. The Fifth Circuit held that the advertising and infor-
mation on Ford's website constitutes commercial speech, and applying Central Hudson, upheld
the regulation. See also United States v. Bell, 238 F. Supp. 2d 696 (M.D. Pa. 2003) (holding
that an operator of a website which promoted tax avoidance was engaged in commercial
speech); Name.Space, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 202 F.3d 573, 586 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting
that domain names may or may not be commercial speech depending on a variety of factors).
189 See, e.g., Drew L. Kershen, Professional Legal Organizations on the Internet: Websites
and Ethics, 4 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 141, 145 (1999) ("Even if a website is primarily informa-
tional, if the content suggests a solicitation for a commercial relationship, the website is com-
mercial speech subject to state regulation."); Jesse H. Sweet, Attorney Advertising on the Infor-
mation Superhighway: A Crash Course in Ethics, 24 J. LEGAL PROF. 201, 210 (2000). In
Planned Parenthood Fed'n of America, Inc. v. Bucci, No. 97 Civ. 0629, 1997 WL 133313
(S.D.N.Y. 1997), affid 152 F.3d 920 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 834 (1998), the defendant,
doing business as Catholic Radio, registered a website at "plannedparenthood.com." However,
the website was actually dedicated to the pro-life position and opposed abortion. Id. at *5-*6.
The defendant argued that his use of plaintiff's mark was non-commercial speech. Id. at *9.
The court disagreed for two reasons: First, although the use of "plannedparenthood.com" was
arguably non-commercial in and of itself, it impacted the plaintiffs ability to offer its own ser-
vices over the Internet. Second, the very use of the Internet is "in commerce" because it re-
quires interstate phone lines to connect. Id. at *11-*12.
190C.C. Laura Lin, Note, Corporate Image Advertising and the First Amendment, 61 S.
CAL. L. REV. 459, 461 (1988) (quoting Subcomm. On Administrative Practice and Procedure of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Sourcebook on Corporate Image and Corporate Advocacy
Advertising, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., at 1156 (1978)).
191 See, e.g., Gina Binole, After Buying MacBlo, Weyerhaeuser Won't Commit on Clear-
Cutting, Bus. J. PORTLAND, June 25, 1999, available at http://portland.bizjournals.com/
portlandlstoriesl1999/06/28/story6.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2004).
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nership with CARE, one of the world's largest international relief
and development organizations. Together, they propose to teach
"sustainable forestry practices and environmental stewardship to
improve living conditions of people in developing countries for
current and future generations."'
192
This type of image advertising also includes companies that
project an ethos of social responsibility and a political philosophy
that consumers presumably can share and support through the pur-
chase of the companies' products. For example, The Body Shop
sells cosmetics and one might reasonably presume that its commu-
nications with the public are intended to sell soap and moisturiz-
ers. 193 The company's owner contends that the central mission of
business is to improve the world by not only caring for its work
force and customers, but also for its communities and the envi-
ronment. 94 She believes that business should be a force for social
good first, and consider bottom line profits second. 195 Thus, The
Body Shop's mission statement specifies that social, environ-
mental, and political values are the fundamental bases of exchange
with its constituents. Specifically, the company's first commit-
ment is to "social and environmental change," and, second, to the
"financial and human needs" of its stakeholders. Further, its prod-
uct pledge involves "the protection of the environment, human and
civil rights" within the cosmetics industry. 96 Whether it is Wey-
erhaeuser's forest management or the Body Shop's focus on "natu-
ral" skin care reflecting broader environmental concerns, these
businesses are speaking on relevant issues that do not come close
to asking consumers to buy their products.
The second type of image advertising is when a company
takes a position on public issues, which is viewed as reflecting cor-
porate values. As such, it is even further removed from actual
192 See Weyerhaeuser, Partnership with Care, at http://www.weyerhaeuser.com/
citizenship/philanthropy/partnershipwithcare.asp (last visited Apr. 16, 2004). Similarly, in
testimony to Congress, former FDA Commissioner David Kessler noted that tobacco companies
engaged in image building through "promotional events labeled as scientific and technical
seminars, special journal supplements and video news releases." Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (Sept. 12, 1991) (statement of David A. Kessler, M.D., Commissioner of
Food and Drugs).
193 See The Body Shop website, at http://www.thebodyshop.com (last visited Apr. 16,
2004).
194The Body Shop's website distills its values as follows: "Against animal testing. Sup-
porting community trade. Activate self-esteem. Defend human rights. Protect our planet." The
Body Shop, Our Values, at http://www.thebodyshop.com/web/tbsgVvalues.jsp (last visited Apr.
16, 2004).
'
95 See Cathy L. Hartman & Caryn L. Beck-Dudley, Marketing Strategies and the Search
for Virtue: A Case Analysis of The Body Shop, International, 20 J. Bus. ETHICS 249-63 (1999).
1
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commercial transactions than advertising to promote the company
itself as a product. For example, when inexpensive Japanese com-
pact cars began to flood the market, American automakers re-
sponded by urging consumers to "buy American."'' 97 When the
president of General Motors takes out newspaper advertisements
or buys air time on television to urge people to "buy American,"
he may argue that purchasing foreign automobiles puts Americans
out of work, and, therefore, that buying his company's cars is a
patriotic act. The speech is both profit motivated and proposes a
commercial transaction. The speaker has direct economic interests
at stake, however, the speech also contributes to the significant
public debate over consumer choice, protectionism, and free
trade.198 "Information about the quality and price of some prod-
ucts may relate to important political issues. For example, a belief
that American cars are overpriced influences views on foreign car
import restrictions, on inflationary price increases for domestic
cars, and on the effects of oligopoly .... "99
Whether or not a court can draw these lines has important le-
gal consequences. For example, in Quinn v. Aetna Life & Casualty
Co.,2°° a state court trial judge ruled that an insurance company's
advertisements blaming high insurance premiums on large tort
damage awards was commercial speech, and thus, could be en-
joined if found to be false or misleading. Plaintiffs involved in on-
going personal injury actions sought to enjoin Aetna from continu-
ing publication of statements in certain magazines that criticized
the tort system and what Aetna perceived to be excessive damages
awarded in many personal injury cases.20 1 The plaintiffs argued
that the advertisements contained misleading statements violating
New York law.20 2 Aetna responded that its publications advocat-
ing tort law reform were political expression and fully protected by
the First Amendment.2 °3 The fundamental disagreement was
whether the mixed commercial/political speech should be deemed
one or the other. This case, as well as the General Motors example
197 To assist consumers in complying with this exhortation, Congress passed the American
Automobile Labeling Act, which requires passenger vehicles manufactured after October 1,
1994 to have labels specifying their percentage value of U.S./Canadian parts content, the coun-
try of assembly, and countries of origin of the engine and transmission. See Juanita S.
Kavalauskas & Charles J. Kahane, Evaluation of the American Automobile Labeling Act (Nat'l
Highway Traffic Safety Admin. Report No. DOT HS 809 208, 2001).
98 See EMORD, supra note 92.
199 Id. at n.25 (quoting Daniel Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory,
74 Nw. U. L. REv. 372, 382 (1979)).
- 409 N.Y.S.2d 473 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978).
201 Id. 474-75.
202 Id. at 475.
203 Id.
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above, demonstrates that sometimes there is no getting around the
fact that speech may be both.2 4
Nonetheless, the state judge ruled that the statements were
commercial speech that could be enjoined if false or misleading.2 °5
The court made its ruling despite the fact that Aetna's purpose was
to influence potential jurors to give lower damage awards, rather
than targeting its statement at consumers who might purchase in-
surance products.20 6 When the case was removed to federal district
court,20 7 the district court judge concluded that the advertisements
were not commercial speech,20 8 and the Second Circuit affirmed.2°
The federal district judge concluded that the state court judge had
"engaged in a fundamental misconception by calling the adver-
tisements here in question 'commercial speech."'
210
Corporate communications intended to reflect well on the
company, highlighting either its internal functions or the way it
interacts with the local, national, and global communities of which
it is a part, should be protected under the First Amendment. This
type of communication does not propose a transaction, even
though it can certainly be construed to set the stage for future
transactions. Nonetheless, the failure to protect this type of
speech-and the consequent chilling affect-deprives potential
and current customers, potential and current investors, potential
and current competitors, and potential and current neighbors from
important information they can use to judge whether they wish to
further associate with the company, or whether they wish to chal-
lenge it.
204 See Alan Howard, The Constitutionality of Deceptive Speech Regulations: Replacing
the Commercial Speech Doctrine with a Tort-based Relational Framework, 41 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 1093, 1143 (1991).
20 409 N.Y.S.2d at 478.2061d.
20 Quinn v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 482 F. Supp. 22, 29 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), afftd, 616
F.2d 38 (2d Cit. 1980) (per curiam).
w8 Id.
209 Quinn, 616 F.2d at 40. The pharmaceutical industry has also sponsored political adver-
tisements-"issue ads"-that praise certain candidates' stands on prescription drug legislation.
The advertisements are prepared and placed by a nonpartisan group called United Seniors Asso-
ciation, but that group is funded largely by unrestricted educational grants from the Pharmaceu-
tical Research and Manufacturers of America. See Thomas B. Edsall, Drug Industry Financing
Fuels Pro-GOP TV Spots, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 2002, at Al 1. The drug companies that are
members of PhRMA undoubtedly would benefit economically if the positions they are advertis-
ing are enacted into law.
210 Quinn, 482 F. Supp. at 29; see also Rutledge v. Liability Ins. Indus., 487 F. Supp. 5
(W.D. La. 1979) (involving insurance company advertising statements). The court similarly
held that the advertisements were not commercial speech because "[tihe ads [made] no attempt
to sell insurance or to recommend any particular type of insurance coverage ..... Id. at 8.
Finding the speech to be fully protected noncommercial speech, the district court concluded that
issuing an injunction in the case would be tantamount to imposing a prior restraint on publica-
tion in violation of the First Amendment. Id. at 8-9.
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CONCLUSION
While hard cases may make bad law,21 sometimes "it is bad
law that is creating the hard cases. 21 2 Central Hudson falls into
this category. The issue before the California Supreme Court in
Nike should not have been "hard." But until the United States Su-
preme Court simplifies First Amendment jurisprudence by protect-
ing corporate engagement in public debate, lower courts will con-
tinue to struggle and the citizenry will be deprived of all sides of
important controversies. Unfortunately, with its refusal to over-
turn the decision of the California Supreme Court, the Nike case
remains a precedent sure to be cited in other jurisdictions by other
litigants seeking to silence their corporate opponents. The risk is
particularly great because the California Supreme Court is not a
backwater tribunal lacking in influence. On the contrary, Califor-
nia jurisprudence commands a deserved reputation for being ahead
of the curve.213
The Supreme Court should treat all speech as deserving the
same protection under the First Amendment. The government then
could regulate commercial speech and mixed speech just as it
would political speech: regulation is constitutional where it fur-
thers an important governmental interest, the governmental interest
is unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and the restric-
tion on expression is no greater than necessary.2t 4 Consumer fraud
statutes could still exist, albeit in much narrow form than Califor-
nia's unfair competition law. There is no question that preventing
consumer fraud furthers a substantial governmental interest. 215
211 See Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400-01 (1904) (Holmes, J., dis-
senting).212 Ashutosh Bhagwat, Hard Cases and the (D)Evolution of Constitutional Doctrine, 30
CONN. L. REV. 961,984 (1998).
213 For example, in Foster-Gardner, Inc. v. National Union Fire Insurance Co., 959 P.2d
265 (Cal. 1998), the California Supreme Court adopted the minority view that insurers do not
have a duty to defend administrative agency proceedings, declaring that the term "suit" means a
legal proceeding initiated by the filing of a lawsuit, as opposed to the initiation of administrative
proceedings. This ruling was then followed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (Granite
Mgmt. Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., No. CV-97-04022-SI, 2002 WL 1192572 (9th Cir. June
4, 2002)), and the State of Illinois (W.C. Richards Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 724
N.E.2d 63 (Il. App. Ct. 1999)). See also Victoria L. Rees, AlDSphobia: Forcing Courts to
Face New Areas of Compensation for Fear of a Deadly Disease, 39 VILL. L. REV. 241, 249 n.41
(1994), noting that the trend towards recovery for emotional distress without accompanying
physical injury began with the California Supreme Court's decision in Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d
912 (Cal. 1968), which established the standard for recovery by a third party who witnessed the
negligent injury of another. A subsequent case, Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 616
P.2d 813 (Cal. 1980), established the California Supreme Court as a trendsetter in this area of
recovery.
214 See, e.g, United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
215 Thus, when the authors to the Foreword of this Symposium posit a situation in which
Nike misrepresents its overseas working conditions to college coaches who indicated that they
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The critical point is that while the seller is free to make true, false,
or misleading claims, he will be liable if buyers rely on those
216claims to make purchases. When there is no reliance, and no
harm, then private counterspeech will serve to remedy falsehoods
placed before the public.
would no longer purchase its products absent clear assurances that the workers were neither
underpaid nor physically abused, see Ronald Collins & David Skover, Foreword, 54 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 965 (2004), Nike could not necessarily seek refuge in the First Amendment. Un-
der California law, if the workers were in fact underpaid and physically abused and Nike knew
it and Nike deliberately lied for the purpose of causing the coaches to rely on the lies and the
coaches purchased Nike products in reliance on those specific statements, then there would be a
cause of action for fraud for which the First Amendment could be no defense. See Lazar v.
Superior Court, 909 P.2d 981, 984 (Cal. 1996) ("The elements of fraud, which give rise to the
tort action for deceit, are (a) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclo-
sure); (b) knowledge of falsity (or 'scienter'); (c) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d)
justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage.").216See Kozinski & Banner, supra note 19, 76 VA. L. REV. at 651.
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